This note provides a counterexample for a large economy in which a rational expectations equilibrium (REE) does not possess the desirable property of incentive compatibility for each agent. The key point here is that the REE equilibrium price depends on the private information of every individual agent. Thus, we propose to focus on those REE prices that depend only on the macro states and are not influenced by individual agents' private information. Such a REE will be incentive compatible.
1 Introduction Radner (1979) and Allen (1981) extended the finite agent Arrow-Debreu-McKenzie economy to allow for asymmetric information, where each agent is characterized by a random utility function, random initial endowment, and private information with a prior. The equilibrium notion that Radner put forward is called rational expectations equilibrium (REE), which is an extension of the deterministic Walrasian equilibrium of the Arrow-Debreu-McKenzie model. According to the REE, each individual maximizes her interim expected utility conditioned on her own private information as well as the information generated by the equilibrium price.
In a REE, the private information possessed by individuals can influence the equilibrium price. This leads to the incentive compatibility issue as individuals may misreport their own private information in their favor. One would imagine that this issue should not arise in a large economy (an economy with an atomless measure space of agents) as each individual is negligible in size compared to the whole population. This note shows the contrary. We provide a counterexample for a REE in a large economy, where every agent can manipulate her private information for a higher utility.
The key point is that even if each individual is negligible in terms of size, her influence on the equilibrium price can nevertheless be significant if we allow the REE price to depend on all the information at the individual level. This suggests that considering an arbitrary REE in a large economy may not lead to desirable results. One should pay attention to those REE prices that capture the meaning of perfect competition, for example, those prices that depend only on the macro states and are not influenced by individual agents' private information. We may also point out that it may be too much to require an equilibrium price to reveal all the private information in a large economy. Our counterexample in Section 4 precisely has this problem.
This note is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the economic model, and the notions of REE and incentive compatibility. The main result is stated in Section 3 with its proof in Section 4. Some concluding remarks are provided in Section 5.
The Economic Model
In this section, we define the notions of a private information economy, rational expectations equilibrium and incentive compatibility by following the model presented in Sun et al. (2012) .
Private information economy
We consider an atomless probability space 1 (I, I, λ) as the space of agents. Each agent receives a private signal q ∈ T 0 = {q 1 , q 2 , . . . , q L }. T 0 is the power set of T 0 . A 1 We use the convention that all probability spaces are countably additive.
signal profile t is a function from I to T 0 . For i ∈ I, t(i) (also denoted by t i ) is the private signal of agent i while t −i is the restriction of t to the set I \ {i}. Let (T, T , P ) be a probability space that models the uncertainty associated with the private signal profiles for all the agents.
2 For simplicity, we shall assume that (T, T ) has a product structure so that T is the product of T −i and T 0 , while T is the product σ-algebra of T 0 and a σ-algebra T −i on T −i . For t ∈ T and t i ∈ T 0 , we shall adopt the usual notation (t −i , t i ) to denote the signal profile whose value is t i for i and t j for j = i.
The private signal process f is a function from I ×T to T 0 such that f (i, t) = t i for any (i, t) ∈ I × T . For each i ∈ I, lett i be the projection mapping from T to T 0 witht i (t) = t i .
We also would like to include another source of uncertainty in our model -the macro level uncertainty. Let S = {s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s K } be the set of all possible macro states of nature, and S the power set of S. The S-valued random variables on T models the macro level uncertainty. For each macro state s ∈ S, denote the event (s = s) = {t ∈ T :s(t) = s} that s occurs by C s . The probability that s occurs is π s = P (C s ). Without loss of generality, assume that π s > 0 for each s ∈ S. Let P s be the conditional probability measure on (T, T ) when the random variables takes value s. Thus, for each B ∈ T , P s (B) = P (C s ∩ B)/π s . It is obvious that P = s∈S π s P s .
The private signal process f is essentially pairwise independent conditioned on the macro state of natures. That is, for λ-almost all i ∈ I,t i andt j are independent conditioned ons for λ-almost j ∈ I. With this independence assumption, we need to work with a joint agent-probability space (I × T, I T , λ P ) that extends the usual measure-theoretic product (I × T, I ⊗ T , λ ⊗ P ) of the agent space (I, I, λ) and the probability space (T, T , P ), and retains the Fubini property, which is called a Fubini extension.
3 The process f is assumed to be I T -measurable. The common consumption set for all the agents is the positive orthant R m + . Let u be a function from I × R m + × T to R + such that for any given i ∈ I, u(i, z, t) 2 Thus T is a space of functions from I to T 0 . 3 See Definition 2.2 of Sun (2006) for a formal definition of Fubini extension. It is shown in Corollary 2.9 of Sun (2006) (see Theorem 3.8 of Sun (1998) for an earlier version) that under any Fubini extension, the exact law of large numbers holds, which plays a key role in some results on general equilibrium theory in Sun (2006) , Sun et al. (2012) and Sun and Yannelis (2008) . The existence of non-trivial independent processes that are measurable in a rich Fubini extension is shown in Theorem 6.2 of Sun (1998) for general atomless Loeb product spaces. Sun (2006, Proposition 5.6) provides another construction of a rich Fubini extension, where the agent space I is the unit interval [0, 1] while the sample space is an extension of the usual continuum product probability space. It is shown in Sun and Zhang (2009) that one can take the relevant agent space to be an extension of the classical Lebesgue unit interval in some rich Fubini extension. Podczeck (2010) shows that the agent space can be a general saturated probability space in some rich Fubini extension; we may point out that his construction does not cover the case of Loeb product spaces as in Theorem 6.2 of Sun (1998) . Since the exact law of large numbers holds in any Fubini extension as shown in Corollary 2.9 of Sun (2006) , it automatically holds in the various rich Fubini extensions constructed in Sun (1998) , Sun (2006) , Zhang (2009) and Podczeck (2010) . Also see Corollary 1 of Wang and Zhang (2010) for a characterization of saturation through rich Fubini extension. is the utility of agent i at consumption bundle z ∈ R m + and signal profile t ∈ T . For any given (i, t) ∈ I × T , we assume that u(i, z, t) (also denoted by
In our model, the initial endowment of an agent depends on her private signal. The initial endowment profile e is a function from I × T 0 to R m + such that for (i, q) ∈ I × T 0 , e(i, q) is the initial endowment of agent i when her private signal is q. We assume that for each q ∈ T 0 , e(·, q) is λ-integrable over I, and I e(i, q)dλ is in the strictly positive cone R m ++ .
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Formally, the private information economy is denoted by E = I × T, u, e, f, (t i , i ∈ I),s .
Rational expectations equilibrium
As usual, a price is a normalized nonnegative vector p in ∆ m , where ∆ m is the unit simplex of R m + . A price processp is a measurable function from T to ∆ m . For each t ∈ T ,p(t) is the price when the signal profile is t. For notational simplicity, the letter p will be used both for a price and a price process. The terms "price" and "price process" are used synonymously in this note.
An allocation x to be a measurable mapping from
is the consumption bundle of agent i when the price is p and her derived signal is q.
Since an agent's initial endowment is contingent on her private signal q ∈ T 0 , we denote the budget set for agent i by B i (p, q) when the price is p and her private signal is q. Hence, B i (p, q) = {z ∈ R m + : p z ≤ p e(i, q)}. Given a consumption bundle z ∈ R m + , a signal q ∈ q 0 and a price p, the interim (conditional) expected utility of agent i is defined as follows:
In the rational expectations equilibrium, an agent updates her belief on the distribution of signal profiles based on her signal and observation of the equilibrium price. She computes her expected utility with the updated belief and aims to maximize the interim expected utility subject to her budget constraint. The formal definition of the rational expectations equilibrium is given below.
Definition 1 (Rational Expectations Equilibrium (REE))
A rational expectations equilibrium for the private information economy E = I × T, u, e, f, (t i , i ∈ I),s is a pair of an allocation and a price process (x * , p * ) such that:
4 In the sequel, we shall often use subscripts to denote some variable of a function that is viewed as a parameter in a particular context.
5 The utility function u(i, ·, t) is monotonic if for any y, z ∈ R m + with y ≤ z and y = z, u(i, y, t) < u(i, z, t).
6 A vector z is in R m ++ if and only if all of its components are positive.
1. x * is feasible, i.e., I x * (i, p * (t), t i )dλ = I e(i, t i )dλ for P -almost all t ∈ T ;
2. for λ-almost all i ∈ I and for P -almost all t ∈ T , x * (i, p * (t), t i ) is a maximizer of the following problem:
The following notion of incentive compatibility says that an agent cannot increase her interim expected utility by mis-reporting her private signal.
Definition 2 (Incentive Compatibility) A REE (x * , p * ) is said to be incentive compatible if for λ-almost all i ∈ I,
holds for P -almost all t ∈ T and for all t i ∈ T 0 .
Incentive Compatibility : A Counterexample
The following result shows that it is not true that under a REE in a large economy, the agents will automatically report their signals truthfully. The key idea in such a result is that the REE price p * can be influenced by the private signal of each individual agent; the details are given in the next section.
Proposition 1 There exists a REE (x * , p * ) in a large private information economy E p , where the private signals are independent of each other, and the macro state functioñ s can be regarded as constant, such that every agent has an incentive to mis-report her signal.
Proof of Proposition 1
In this section, we need to use some very basic nonstandard analysis. The reader can refer to the book Loeb and Wolff (2000) . Fix an infinitely large even hyperinteger n ∈ * N ∞ . Let I be {1, 2, . . . , n} with its internal power set I 0 and internal counting probability measure λ 0 on I 0 with λ 0 (A) = |A|/|I| for any A ∈ I 0 , where |A| is the internal cardinality of A. Let (I, I, λ) be the Loeb space of the internal probability space (I, I 0 , λ 0 ), which will serve as the space of agents for the large private information economy considered here.
Let T 0 = {0, 1} be the signals for individual agents, and T the set of all the internal functions from I to T 0 (the space of signal profiles). Let T 0 be the internal power set on T , P 0 the internal counting probability measure on (T, T 0 ) (i.e., the probability weight for each t = (t 1 , t 2 , . . . , t n ) ∈ T under P 0 is 1/2 n ), and (T, T , P ) the corresponding Loeb space.
Let (I ×T, I 0 ⊗T 0 , λ 0 ⊗P 0 ) be the internal product probability space of (I, I 0 , λ 0 ) and (T, T 0 , P 0 ). Let (I ×T, I T , λ P ) be the Loeb space of the internal product (I × T, I 0 ⊗ T 0 , λ 0 ⊗ P 0 ), which is indeed a Fubini extension of the usual product probability space by Keisler's Fubini Theorem (see, for example, Loeb and Wolff (2000)). Let f (i, t) = t i . Then, the private signals f i are independent of each other. That is, we can assume that the macro state functions is constant.
The common consumption space is the nonnegative orthant R 7 Given a price system
if i is odd, and
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It can be checked that p 1 = ( ) are equilibrium prices of such a large deterministic economy.
8 Under the equilibrium price p 1 , agent i's demand and utility are respectively . Now, for the corresponding private information economy, define a price process
Fix an agent i ∈ I with i odd. Consider the signal profile t ∈ T with n j=1 t j odd (the probability of such an event is half). Then,
3/2 . However, if agent i mis-reports her type from t i to t i = 1 − t i , then 1 − t i + n j =i t j is even, and her consumption would become x * (i, p
with a strictly higher utility u 2 i = 148 175 3/2 . Since u i does not depend on t, the interim (conditional) expected utility U i (z|p, q) as in equation (1) is always u i (z). Hence, for 7 These utility functions, which are continuous, are taken from (Mas-Colell et al., 1995, 15.B.6, p. 541) .
8 A third equilibrium price is ( t ∈ T with n j=1 t j odd and t i = 1 − t i , we have
, which is strictly less than
Next, fix an agent i ∈ I with i even. Consider the signal profile t ∈ T with n j=1 t j even (the probability of such an event is half). Then,
3/2 . However, if agent i mis-reports her type from t i to t i = 1 − t i , then 1−t i + n j =i t j is odd, and her consumption would become x * (i, p
with a strictly higher utility u
3/2 . Hence, for t ∈ T with n j=1 t j even and
Therefore, every agent can mis-report her private signal to obtain a strictly higher utility under an event with probability 1/2. This means that the incentive compatibility condition fails for every agent.
Concluding Remarks
A REE in a large economy is naturally expected to be incentive compatible as each individual in such an economy is intuitively negligible. This note provides a counterexample showing the contrary. In the counterexample the equilibrium price flips as an individual switches from one private signal to another unilaterally, resulting in a better utility for the individual. We believe that it may be too much to require an equilibrium price to reveal the private information of every individual agent in a large economy. Therefore, we propose that one should restrict the attention to those equilibria whose prices capture the meaning of perfect competition, for example, prices that depend only on macro state of nature, as in Sun et al. (2012) and Sun and Yannelis (2008) . When the REE price depends only on the macro states, incentive compatibility is not an issue since an individual agent's private signal cannot influence the macro states. In the recent papers of Castro et al. (2011) and Condie and Ganguli (2011) , the Bayesian conditional expected utility as used here is replaced by the maximin expected utility in the setting of
